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COMMENT

Federalism, Popular Sovereignty, and the
Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms: A
Structural Alternative to
United States v. Emerson
JACK TRACHTENBERGt
Let us not insult the free and gallant citizens of America with the
suspicion that they would be less able to defend the rights of which
they are in actual possession, than the debased subjects of
arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their
oppressors.
---James Madison'
INTRODUCTION

Debate on guns, gun control, and the Second
Amendment is "often savage."2 Polar opposite positions tend
t B.A. and M.A. in Political Science, Case Western Reserve University, 1999.
J.D. Candidate, University at Buffalo Law School, Spring 2002. I would like to
thank my wife, Christina, for her never-ending inspiration, understanding, love,
and support; my parents for providing me a loving and supportive upbringing
that encouraged and allowed me to pursue my highest dreams; my brother
Marc for always making me laugh and helping me keep life's ups and downs in
perspective; and Professor Laura Tartakoff for acting as a model in the search
for truth and justice, and for flaming my reverence of our great republic, these
United States of America.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 300 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
2. Anthony J. Dennis, Clearingthe Smoke from the Right to Bear Arms and
the Second Amendment, 29 AKRON L. REv. 57, 58 (1995).
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to be taken, raising intense passions suggestive of the
statement " 'that we are experiencing a sort of low-grade
war.., between two alternative views of what America is
and ought to be.' "' Scholarly debate is often clouded by fear
of possible policy implications.4 That there may be some
link between the right of the people to bear arms and
liberty is ignored, if not ridiculed.
Apprehensive of a return to the Old West, those seeking
to limit or annihilate private ownership of guns cite a host
of statistics to show that they are the cause of interpersonal
violence.6 They emphasize horrific descriptions of the

3. Id.; see also Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibitionand the Original
Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 206 (1983) ("The
meaning of [the Second Amendment] has been extensively debated in light of
what has aptly been termed 'The Great American Gun War.' ") (footnote
omitted).
4. See generally Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond Amendment,
99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
I cannot help but suspect that the best explanation for the absence of
the Second Amendment from the legal consciousness of the elite bar,
including that component found in the legal academy, is derived from a
mixture of sheer opposition to the idea of private ownership of guns
and the perhaps subconscious fear that altogether plausible, perhaps
even "winning," interpretations of the Second Amendment would
present real hurdles to those of us supporting prohibitory regulation.
Id. at 642 (footnotes omitted).
5. One author has stated:
[Ilt is irresponsible to make arguments about the relationship between
arms and liberty as if we did not live in... an era of thoroughly
disintegrated public life and disintegrating social order, and an era of
rampant violence within and against the urban poor and against
women of all socio-economic classes.
Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, PhiladelphiaMayors, and Civic Republicanism:
On Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J.
661, 665 (1989). Professor Brown goes on to recount a story of help she and her
three friends received from two men when their car would not start. She
describes one of the men, obviously an NRA member and gun owner, as a
"California sportsman making his way through a case of beer, flipping through
the pages of a porn magazine, and preparing to survey the area for his hunting
club in anticipation of the opening of deer season." Id. at 666. She apparently
appreciated the assistance, but it "occurred to [her] then ... that if [s]he had
run into him in those woods without [her] friends or a common project for
[them] to work on, [she] would have been seized with one great and appropriate
fear: rape." Id. As Professor Brown notes, "his gun could well have made the
difference between an assault that [her] hard-won skills in self-defense could
have fended off and one against which they were useless." Id. at 666-67.
6. See MICHAEL A. BELLESILES, ARMING AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A
NATIONAL GUN CULTURE

4-5 (2000).
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Jonesboro and Columbine school shootings 7 as if to imply
the question: Is the cost of enforcing the right to own guns
really worth it?
This outcome-based approach leads inevitably to an
often passionately expressed sentiment regarding the
meaning and interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. It is
that the document is flexible, if not wholly vague, and
designed to withstand interpretations that change with the
times and problems it confronts. While common sense
dictates that the words, phrases, and provisions in the
Constitution contain a particular meaning and convey a
specific intent, it seems reasonable that our governmental
charter can withstand a degree of interpretive elasticity
within the margins of its federalist structure. In the end,
however, no reading of the Constitution, no matter the
interpretive theory deployed,8 may violate the fundamental
structure of our system-a structure that was designed to
carefully allocate power between the people and their
governments, and in the process act as the primary
safeguard for our fundamental liberties and freedoms.
Part I of this Comment will begin with a brief
discussion of the district court's decision in United States v.
Emerson.9 The Emerson court interpreted the Second
Amendment as protecting a personal right to bear arms.
This holding contradicts many decisions in federal circuits
maintaining that the Second Amendment's protections
reach only the states' right to arm a militia. The Emerson
court's textual and historical reading, while accurate, will
lay the groundwork for an alternative analysis of the
Amendment-one that provides a stronger justification for
the individual rights theory and closes the door to debate on
ancillary grounds such as text, history, prudence, and
ethics.
Part II will explore the nature of our constitutional
system. It will consider the appropriateness of the
"federalism" label often placed on our governmental
framework and settle more appropriately on what the
Framers considered to be a "compound government" that
7. See id. at 3-4.
8. The interpretive methods typically used are textual, historical, structural,
doctrinal, prudential, and ethical. See Levinson, supra note 4, at 643 (citing
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 25-119 (1982)).
9. 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

448

[Vol. 50

incorporated both national and federal qualities. This
examination will solidly establish the ultimate sovereignty
of the people in our constitutional republic and confirm
their unrestricted birthright to allocate, remove, and retain
power and authority, as they deem appropriate. This
concept of popular sovereignty will then be applied to the
Bill of Rights to show that its provisions, including the
Second Amendment, provide a primarily structural
protection for the people, not the states.
Finally, Part III will validate the claim that the Second
Amendment's right to keep and bear arms protects the
individual citizen, as well as the collective body of the
people. The relationship between the Second Amendment
and the congressional military powers of Article I will be
contemplated, and the argument that the Amendment was
intended only to ensure the proper allocation of military
power between the national and state governments
addressed. The notion of popular sovereignty will be
reasserted to show that the right of the people to keep and
bear arms necessarily connotes the right of the individual to
do so.
I.

UNITED STATES V. EMERSON

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is a relatively obscure provision of
the 1994 Violent Crime Control Act." It imposes a ban on
firearms possession by any individual who is subject to a
restraining order." In United States v. Emerson,2 Judge
10. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110401(c)(3), 180 Stat. 1796, 2014 (1994). The
Act's official title is the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994. It is more widely known for its prohibition of certain items deemed to be
assault weapons. Nelson Lund, Taking the Second Amendment Seriously,
WEEKLY STANDARD, July 24, 2000, at 21.

11. The statute states:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person(8) who is subject to a court order that(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual
notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an
intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or
person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate
partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and
(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat
to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or

2002]

UNITED STATES V. EMERSON

449

Samuel R. Cummings dismissed an indictment under §
922(g)(8) on the ground that the statute
violates the Second
3
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
A. Facts and Holding
The facts of the case are straightforward. Defendant
Timothy Joe Emerson, a Texas physician, legally purchased
a handgun in 1997."4 One year later, his wife filed for a
divorce and an application for a temporary restraining
order. The order contained twenty-nine separate
prohibitions aimed primarily at protecting Mrs. Emerson's
financial interests.' It also restrained Dr. Emerson from
interfering with the couple's child in various ways, from
threatening or injuring his wife, and from communicating
with her in a vulgar or indecent manner. 6 While Mrs.
Emerson made no showing, and the judge made no finding,
that Dr. Emerson had committed or was likely to commit
any of the prohibited acts (she even admitted that he had
never threatened her), the order was issued as a matter of
routine procedure. 7 After the order was issued, Mrs.
threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child
that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury ....
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
12. 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
13. Judge Cummings also held that the statute violated the defendant's
Fifth Amendment due process rights, but rejected arguments that it was an
unconstitutional exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause or
that it violated the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 600, 613-14. While scholars have
created "a forest of law review articles and scholarly papers over the past 10
years" regarding the scope of the Amendment's protections, Judge Cummings is
the first federal judge to rule that the Amendment guarantees an individual
right to own a gun. Richard Willing, Case Could Shape Future of Gun Control,
USA TODAY, Aug. 27, 1999, at Al.
14. Lund, supra note 10, at 21.
15. See In re Marriage of Emerson, No. B-98-0939-F, available at
http://www.saf.org/pub/rkba/generalEmersonOrder2.htm (last visited Sept. 22,
2001).
16. See id.; see also Nelson Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment
Jurisprudence:FirearmsDisabilitiesand Domestic Violence Restraining Orders,
4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 157, 159-160 (1999).
17. See Lund, supra note 16, at 160. "It is apparently routine for Texas
courts to issue prophylactic restraining orders in divorce cases, without findings
or even evidence that the acts prohibited in those orders would otherwise be
likely to occur." Id. (footnote omitted). Dr. Emerson was eventually found not
guilty by a jury of his peers on state charges of aggravated assault and
endangerment of a child. The jury of nine women and three men deliberated for
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Emerson accused her husband of brandishing his pistol and
federal prosecutors began an investigation. They later
indicted Dr. Emerson for violating 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(8)(C)(ii), which makes it a federal crime to possess a
firearm while subject to a restraining order that explicitly
prohibits violence or threatened violence against an
intimate partner."1

Judge Cummings held § 922(g)(8) unconstitutional
because it allowed the government to deprive Dr. Emerson
of his Second Amendment rights without any finding that
he posed a credible threat to anyone, let alone his wife or
child.1 Without any reasonable nexus between the gun
possession and a threat of violence, the statute empowers
the state to arbitrarily abridge Dr. Emerson's rights simply
by issuing a prophylactic, boilerplate, civil court order
"'prohibit[ing] the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against an intimate partner.' ,,20
As Judge
Cummings stated:
[P]rosecution based on such an order would be tautological, for §
922(g)(8)(C)(i) [sic] merely repeats in different wording the
requirement in subsection (B) that the order "restrains such
person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate

less than an hour. They were apparently swayed by evidence that Emerson's
wife was less than truthful on several occasions. Dr. Emerson Found Not Guilty
of All State Charges!!!!, at http://www.saf.org/pub/rkba/news/EmersonState
Win2.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2001). That a jury sided with Dr. Emerson may
"indicate[ ] how easy it is to bar gun ownership based on a boilerplate
restrainingorder where not [sic] finding of credible threat is required." Id. It
may also "reassure the Fifth Circuit Judges" who seemed concerned that Dr.
Emerson was an" 'implied danger'" given the circumstances. Id.
18. The government was limited to indicting Dr. Emerson under subsection
(C)(ii) which only requires that a person be subject to an order that "by its
terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against an intimate partner or child." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) (1994).
Since there had been no finding that Emerson posed any threat to his wife or
child, he could not be indicted under subsection (C)(i) which requires "afinding
that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety" of an
intimate partner or child. Id. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i). Since, as a matter of routine, the
order prohibited violence against his wife and child, the prosecutors were able
to claim that there was an explicit prohibition in the restraining order, thus
satisfying (C)(ii). See Lund, supra note 16, at 162.
19. United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 610 ("18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(8) is unconstitutional because it allows a state court divorce proceeding,
without particularized findings of the threat of future violence, to automatically
deprive a citizen of his Second Amendment rights.").
20. Id. at 611 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii)).
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partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person,
or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate21partner
in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child."

Judge Cummings further stated that such a
prosecutorial theory creates the possibility that a citizen
may be stripped of his rights "not because he has committed
some wrong in the past, or because a judge finds he may
commit some crime in the future, but merely because he is
in a divorce proceeding."22
B. Second Amendment Schools of Thought
The persuasiveness of Judge Cummings's logic should
seem as obvious and uncontroversial as it does when
applied to other provisions of the Bill of Rights. For
instance, while the law prohibits us from libeling one
another, the government may not order us to remain silent
or ban our printing presses simply by issuing a court order
that prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
libel against another person." That would allow other
branches of government, such as the legislature, to outlaw
(or commandeer) private citizens' printing presses as a
means to prevent libel.24 Such measures clearly constitute
prior restraints and violate the First Amendment.
So why does the argument as applied to the Second
Amendment lack the general palpability it is granted when
applied to the First Amendment? Unless the Second
Amendment is in some way fundamentally different than
the First, should not the same argument apply? Should not
the government be prohibited from abridging Second
Amendment rights simply by telling you not to hurt
anyone?
These questions bring us to the crux of Judge
Cummings's holding, to the fundamental premise underlying his decision, and to the heart of the debate
surrounding the scope of the Amendment's protections. As
the Judge noted at the outset of his opinion, "[o]nly if the
21. Id. The quoted statutory language is taken from § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii).
22. Id. Judge Cummings contrasted this case to the felon in possession
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994), which deprives a person of his Second
Amendment rights upon conviction of a felony. Id.
23. See Lund, supra note 16, at 163.
24. Id.
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Second Amendment guarantees Emerson a personal right
to bear arms can he claim a constitutional violation."25
Judge Cummings decided it does. Most other courts
disagree. While it is uniformly accepted that the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments shield the
individual from governmental intrusion, a significant

debate seemingly exists whether the same is true for the
Second 6
There are two main schools of thought. The individual
rights theory falls in line with Judge Cummings's holding;
it maintains that the Second Amendment's protections
reach the individual. 7 Private ownership of arms is a right
"inherent in the concept of ordered liberty,"" and is secured
by the Constitution. States' rights theorists,2 9 often citing
the opening phrase of the Amendment--"A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of the free State"3 insist that the provision only allows the states to set up and
maintain militias. Under their reasoning, a protection for
the individual's right to bear arms does not exist. 1

25. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 600 (emphasis added).
26. In fact, the controversy is almost entirely academic, finding its voice
primarily in scholarly circles. The U.S. government considers the issue " 'Well
settled' that the Second Amendment creates a right held by the States and does
not protect an individual right to bear arms." Id. In the federal courts, the
debate is virtually non-existent. Judge Cummings's decision "is inconsistent
with a very large mountain of precedent." Lund, supra note 16, at 164. Every
other court of appeals either has directly rejected Judge Cummings's approach
or has failed to accept it. Id.
27. See Kates, supra note 3, at 206.
28. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
29. This theory is also referred to as the "collective rights" hypothesis. Id.;
see also William C. Plouffe, Jr., A Federal Court Holds the Second Amendment
Is an Individual Right: Jeffersonian Utopia or Apocalypse Now?, 30 U. MEM. L.
REV. 55, 106-07 (1999) (discussing the collective rights hypothesis).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. II. The full text of the Amendment reads: "A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of the free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." Id.
31. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 600; see also David E. Johnson, Taking a
Second Look at the Second Amendment and Modern Gun Control Laws, 86 KY.
L.J. 197, 198 (1997-98) ("[States' rights] proponents... [hold] that the right was
to extend only so far as necessary for the several states to establish and
maintain militias, and in no way creates or protects an individual right to own
arms.") (footnote omitted); Kates, supra note 3, at 207; Plouffe, supra note 29, at
106-07 ("The collective right hypothesis refers to the idea that the right to keep
and bear arms guaranteed to, the 'people' in the Second Amendment is actually
guaranteed to the state, by permitting the states to form and maintain
militias.") (footnote omitted).
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C. The Emerson Analysis
While the Emerson analysis is perfectly sound, and
even persuasive, this paper seeks to provide a more
convincing justification for the conclusion that the Second
Amendment offers protection for the individual. Before
laying out an alternative analysis, however, let us first
examine Emerson's methodology and point out the reasons
for its weakness.
In a fashion that is quite common among those who
have debated the meaning of the Amendment, Judge
Cummings engaged primarily in a textual and historical
analysis to support his individual rights holding.32
1. Textual Analysis. Judge Cummings's analysis began
with the context and plain language of the Amendment. He
held that, fundamentally, reference to "the people" should
be interpreted in the same manner it is in the First, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.33 He noted that the states'
rights theorists improperly focus on the first clause of the
Amendment ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of the free State"34 ) and ignore the second
clause ("the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed"35 ). A proper understanding would read
both clauses "in pari materia, to give effect and harmonize
both clauses, rather than construe them as being mutually
exclusive. 6 In other words, if the Amendment simply read,
"the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed," there would be no debate. However, the
Amendment contains two clauses, and as Judge Cummings
points out, the first is subordinate and the second
independent.37 Interpreting the first to qualify the second is
improper. Collective rights advocates are wrong that,
because it is a well-regulated militia that is necessary to
the security of a free state, somehow the right of the people
to keep and bear arms is constrained.38 The Amendment
does not read "[t]o the extent a well regulated Militia is
necessary"3 9 to the security of a free State, the right of the
32. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 600-07. The opinion's historical analysis
includes discussion under the subheadings of "English History," "The Colonial
Right to Bear Arms," "The Ratification Debates," and "Drafting the Second
Amendment." Id. at 601-07; see also Lund; supra note 16, at 162 ("Judge
Cummings's opinion.., included a lengthy discussion of the history and
meaning of the Second Amendment....").
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people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.
Instead, "[w]hat the introductory phrase tells us is that this
individual right is protected, at least in
4 part, because doing
so will foster a well-regulated militia." 1

2. History. Judge Cummings further based his ruling
on a historical analysis. First, the court noted that a review
of English history "explains the founders' intent in drafting
the Second Amendment."41 Noting the efforts of Charles II
and James II to disarm their subjects, the court focused on
the right of Englishmen to bear arms as it was eventually
codified in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.4 Because this
33. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 601; Plouffe, supra note 29, at 61; see also
Lund, supra note 16, at 174 ("[Mloreover, the framers of the Bill of Rights were
quite aware of the difference between the 'people' and the 'states.' Thus, the
framers of this constitutional provision clearly did not mean to say that 'the
right of the states to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.' ").
34. U.S. CONST. amend. II, § 1.
35. Id. § 2.
36. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 600-01.
37. Id. at 601; see also Lund, supra note 10, at 23 (referring to the two
clauses as the "introductory phrase" and the "operative clause," respectively).
38. See Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 601 ("[Ihf the amendment truly meant
what collective rights advocates propose, then the text would read '[a] well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
States to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.' "). For a further
discussion of a textual analysis that is in line with Judge Cummings's, see
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 51 (1998). Professor Amar writes:
The states'-rights reading puts great weight on the word militia, but
this word appears only in the amendment's subordinate clause. The
ultimate right to keep and bear arms belongs to "the people," not the
states ... [When the Constitution means "states," it says so. Thus...
"the people" at the core of the Second Amendment are the same people
at the heart of the Preamble and the First Amendment.
Id.
39. Johnson, supra note 31, at 200 (emphasis added).
40. Lund, supra note 10, at 23. Lund uses the Patent and Copyright Clause
in Article I, § 8 to illustrate why this is the case. The clause, which is the closest
grammatically to the Second, gives the Congress power "[tlo promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 8. "Nobody thinks the prefatory language limits the
reach of the granted power. It doesn't mean that Congress must stop granting
copyrights to racists or pornographers ... who are hardly promoting the
progress of science." Lund, supra note 10, at 21; see also Lund, supra note 16, at
175-76 (discussing the Patent and Copyright clause).
41. Emerson, 46 F. Sipp.' 2d at 602.
42. Id. The English Bill of Rights provided that "the subjects which are
Protestants may have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions and as
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right existed prior to and concurrent with the American
Revolution, the court next looked to the experience of the
American colonists in the exercise of that right to bear
arms. 43 Statutes in effect at the time-many of which
required people to maintain arms-reflect heavily on an
intent to ensure the arming of the individual. 4
Furthermore, it was efforts by the British, like those of
Charles II and James II, to disarm the colonists that
"hardened American resistance., 45 Third, the court reviewed
the ratification debates on the Constitution. Its review of
scholarly and historical works supported the position that
the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right.4" As
Noah Webster remarked at his state's ratifying convention:
Before a standing army can rule the people must be disarmed; as
they are in almost every kingdom in Europe. The supreme power
in America cannot enforce unjust laws by the sword; because the
whole body of the people are armed, and constitute a force superior

allowed by law." Id. (quoting David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies:
Toward a Jurisprudenceof the Second Amendment, 9 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
559, 562 (1986) (citing JOHN J. BAGLEY & PETER B. ROWLEY, A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1066-1540, at 152 (1965)). For a further discussion of the
bill passed by King Charles II prohibiting all commoners from owning private
arms, see Johnson, supra note 31, at 205-06.
43. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 602. The English government guaranteed to
all the colonists that they would retain "'all the rights of natural subjects, as if
born and abiding in England.' "Id. (quoting JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND
BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 138 (1994)).
44. See id. One such Virginia law required " 'all masters of families' to
furnish themselves and 'all those of their families which shall be capable of
arms.., with arms both offensive and defensive.' " Id. (quoting MALCOLM,
supra note 43, at 139 (citing THE OLD DOMINION IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF VIRGINIA, 1606-1689, at 172 (Warren M Billings ed.

1975))). Yet another Virginia statute "required 'all men that are fittinge to
beare armes, shall bring their pieces to church... for drill and target practice.'"
Id. (quoting WILLIAM W. HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION
OF ALL THE LAW OF VIRGINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE

1619, at 173-74 (reprint 1969) (1823)).
45. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d. at 603. These efforts led directly to the
formation of the Minutemen, "anationwide select militia organization." Id.
46. Id. at 604-06. For further discussion of the ratification debates, see
Johnson, supra note 31, at 208. Johnson states that "[tihere was a common
understanding among the Framers, based on the English tradition, and in light
of their own recent experiences, that the existence of an individual right to own
arms was not really a subject for debate. The necessity of gun ownership by a
free citizenry was taken for granted." Id. at 207 ,(footnote omitted).
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to any brand of regular troops that can be, on any pretence, raised
in the United States.4 7

Finally, the Emerson court looked to James Madison,
the drafter of the Second Amendment. It concluded that he
clearly envisioned a personal right to bear arms. 41
II. THE FEDERALISM ALTERNATIVE?
As noted, Judge Cummings's analytical method in
Emerson is typical. This is not intended to imply that it is
unpersuasive or unworthy of due consideration. It is, and
this author, for one, is more than convinced of the accuracy
and ultimate correctness of the judge's arguments and
conclusions. However, while the legal discourse is replete
with debate that centers on the text and history of the
Second Amendment,49 no semblance of a consensus has been
reached.
This is not surprising. Focusing solely on the text and
history misses the point altogether. It partakes of a
scrutiny that is divorced from a proper understanding of the
Second Amendment, and in fact, the entire Bill of Rights.
Argument only on the text and history of the Amendment
attempts an analysis out of context. It severs the provision
from the remainder of the Constitution and fails to consider
the meaning of its protections within the framework of the
entire government structure.
At its heart, the Constitution is a charter for republican
government. Less substantive than structural, it establishes a system of government concerned with a vertical
division of powers between the central and state
governments, a horizontal separation of powers between the
47. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 604.

48. Id. at 606. Madison's draft read: "The right of the people to keep and
bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed, and well regulated militia being
the best security of a free country: but no person religiously scrupulous of
bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service." Id.
49. See, e.g., Robert Harman, The People's Right to Bear Arms-What the
Second Amendment Protects:An Analysis of the Current Debate Regarding What
the Second Amendment Really Protects, 18 WHITTIER L. REv. 411 (1997);

Johnson, supra note 31, at 198 (discussing the debate between the "collective
rights" and the "individual rights" schools); Plouffe, supra note 29, at 105-06
(comparing the federal judiciary's interpretation of the right to bear arms as a
collective right with that of a majority of scholars who interpret the right to
keep and bear arms as an individual right).
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branches of those governments, and a limitation on the
power entrusted to the central government.
This structure, properly employed, is the ultimate
bulwark of individual liberty. Once one understands how
our republic was formed, along with its nature as

constructed by the Constitution, it is easy to recognize the
character of the protections inherent in the Second
Amendment and other provisions of the Bill of Rights.
A. Compound Government
Federalism: It is often viewed as America's unique
invention and contribution to the world of political science.
The concept, resting on the notion of limited government
and a belief that the structure of its authority is primarily
responsible for the protection of individual liberty, is "full of
the inspired political thought of a generation schooled in
the Enlightenment."5 ' Ask a contemporary scholar what
federalism is and one is likely to be referred to The
52 Yet, a proper understanding of our constiFederalist.
tutional system recognizes that The Federalist itself does
not characterize it as a federal government.53 "The proposed
Constitution... is in strictness neither a national nor a
federal constitution; but a composition of both."54
This reference to a compound system, comprised of
national and federal characteristics, reflects a difference in
50. See Jay S. Bybee, The Tenth Amendment Among the Shadows: On
Reading the Constitution in Plato'sCave, 23 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLy' 551, 554 &
n.12 (2000).
51. Id. at 554.
52. Following the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, opposition to
the proposed constitution mobilized. Led by John Lamb, George Mason, Luther
Martin, John Lansing, and Robert Yates, the Antifederalists published
speeches, articles, pamphlets, and letters attacking the Convention's plan of
government. Four states-Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Virginia, and New
York-became crucial to the ratification battle. As a result, an intense
propaganda effort was begun to sway the voters, especially in New York.
"Publius," the pseudonym for Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James
Madison, went on to publish eighty-five letters that laid out the argument for
ratification. See THE FEDERALIST vii-ix (Gary Wills ed., 1982). Even today the
Federalist papers supply us "with the most authoritative interpretation of the
Constitution." Id. at xi.
53. See Martin Diamond, The Federaliston Federalism:"Neithera National
Nor a Federal Constitution, But a Composition of Both," 86 YALE L.J. 1273
(1977).
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 1, at 246 (James Madison).
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terminology from that which we use today in describing our
constitutional framework. We think of the Framers as
having created a new "federal" system that is distinct from
either a confederation or a purely national government.
This modern understanding rests, in part, on a distinction
between the terms "confederalism" and "federalism" that
the Founders did not make.5 The Founding generation saw
only two basic forms of government to choose from.
Confederalism (simply another term for federalism) was the
"mode which preserves the primacy and autonomy of the
states."" A national or unitary government was the "mode
which gives unimpeded primacy to the government of the
whole society."57 The Federalist then, maintained a "strict
distinction between the federal and national elements in
our compound political system." 8
Thus, if what we call our federal system is actually a
compound one, it is critical to understand which elements
are national and which are federal. In The Federalist No.
39, James Madison explores the compound theory and
"offers a clearer and fuller account of [what we call]
federalism."59 He provides five ways in which we can
"ascertain the real character of the government." 0
First, Madison examines the process by which the
Constitution is to be ratified. He states, "it appears ... that

the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and
ratification of the people of America... not as individuals
composing one entire nation; but as composing the distinctl
and independent States to which they respectively belong.'
Thus, the act of establishing the Constitution-of conferring
authority upon it-is federal, not national. It requires the
assent of each state as distinct entities to complete the
process, albeit with power derived from the supreme
authority in each state-the people.62
55. Diamond, supra note 53, at 1274. The modem understanding of
federalism, as we will see, also illustrates our tendency to treat but one aspect
of our constitutional system as the whole of it. See id. at 1279 (discussing The
Federalist'sexamination of federalism).
56. Id. at 1274.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1278.
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 1, at 243 (James Madison).
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. See id. Madison goes on to say:
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Second, Madison considers the sources from which the
government derives its powers. The House of Representatives is national."3 It obtains its power from the people of
the Union.' They are represented in a single body exactly
as they would be in any state legislature.65 The Senate,
however, is federal. It draws its power from the states as coequals." The Presidency contains both national and federal
characteristics. The states elect the President in their
political capacity, 67 but votes are allotted to the states in "a
compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct
and coequal societies; partly as unequal members of the
same society.""
Third, Madison looks to the operation of the
government in exercising its powers. In this sense, the
government is primarily national because it can, as any
other national government, reach each individual citizen."
As Madison precisely makes the point:
The difference between a federal and national Government as it
relates to the operationof the Government is supposed to consist of
this, that in the former, the powers operate on the political bodies
composing the confederacy, in their political capacities: In the
citizens, composing the nation, in their
latter, on the individual
70
individual capacities.

That it will be a federal and not a national act.., is obvious from this
single consideration that it is to result neither from the decision of a
majority of the people of the Union, nor from that of a majority of the
States. It must result from the unanimous assent of the several States
that are parties to it.
Id.; see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is
the consent of the people of each individual State, not the consent of the
undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole.") (citing THE FEDERALIST No.
39, at 243 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
63. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 1, at 244 (James Madison).
64. Id.
65. See id.; Diamond, supra note 53, at 1278.
66. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 1, at 244 (James Madison).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 245; see also Diamond, supra note 53, at 1279.
70. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 1, at 244-45 (James Madison).
Madison notes that the operation of government power is not wholly national, a
"blemish [that] is perhaps unavoidable," because in several cases-particularly
in the trial of controversies to which States are parties-they are proceeded
against in their "collective and political capacities only." Id.

460

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

Fourth, Madison analyzes the extent of the
government's powers, noting that "[tihe idea of a national
government involves in it not only an authority over the
individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all
persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful
government."' 1 In this relation, the government cannot be a
national one. Supremacy is not vested completely in one
national legislature. Congress's jurisdiction extends only to
those powers enumerated, "and leaves to the several States
a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other
objects."' 2 Here, it is interesting to note that Madison, in
denying the national character regarding the scope of
power, is not saying it is federal. It is not. Madison's notion
was best conveyed by Alexis de Tocqueville's observation
that, " '[c]learly here we have not a federal government but
an incomplete national government.'

""

In other words, one

must read Madison's third observation (regarding the
extent of government's reach) and fourth observation
(relating to the scope of its powers) combined, such that the
central government is national to the extent of its
enumerated powers, but federal in that much of the
governingpower remains with the people and the states.
Fifth, and last, Madison examines the amending
process. It, he claims, is neither completely national nor
federal in character. 4 Were it national, the capability to
amend the Constitution would reside in the majority of the
people of the entire nation. Were it federal, the consent of
each state would be necessary to alter it.75
71. Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
72. Id.

73. Diamond, supra note 53, at 1274 (quoting ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 143 (J. Mayer & M. Lerner eds. 1966)) (emphasis
added).
74. Id. at 1279.
75. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 1, at 246 (James Madison). Madison
writes:
Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would
reside in the majority of the people of the Union; and this authority
would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every
national society to alter or abolish its established government. Were it
wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the
Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on
all. The mode provided by the plan of the convention is not founded on
either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and
particularly in computing the proportion by States, not by citizens, it
departs from the national and advances towards the federal character;
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The foregoing analysis by the "father of the
Constitution"' supports the contention that the Second
Amendment protects the individual's right to possess arms.
For there is one fundamental truth threaded through the
constitutional fabric described above: The people are
sovereign.
B. PopularSovereignty
"I start with some first principles.... Our system of
government rests on one overriding principle: all power
stems from the consent of the people."77 Madison's five
points on compound government make this clear. Most
notably, the interplay between points one, three, and four
indicate that all national power derives itself from the
consent of the people as the ultimate sovereign. The people
of each state assented to transfer certain of their own
powers, as well as certain powers of their state
governments, to a national government. Once done, the
national government could act on behalf of every citizen,
regardless of state citizenship, but only to effectuate those
limited and enumerated powers granted to it by the people
via the ratification process. Where the people did not
delegate power, they kept it.
That the people are the ultimate sovereign, possessed
with certain natural rights, and vested with the prerogative
to retain, delegate, or remove authority as they deem
appropriate is a notion that fills the national discourse of
our Founding era. Deeply committed to the natural rights
and social contract theories of John Locke, William
Blackstone, and the Enlightenment philosophers,78 the
Founders refused to view the people's rights as contingent
upon the good graces of any government. Rights are not the

in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of States
sufficient, it loses again the federal, and partakes of the national
character.

Id.
76.

THE SPIRIT OF AMERICA

82 (William J. Bennet ed., 1997).

77. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995) (Thomas,

J., dissenting).
78. See Thomas B. McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and
the Rights "Retained"by the People, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 267 (1992), reprinted in 2
THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH

AMENDMENT 327 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1993).
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result of a positive grant of privilege, capable of being taken
away as easily as they had been given.79 As John Adams
declared, they are " 'antecedent to all earthly government-

Rights that cannot be repealed or restrained by human

laws-Rights derived from the great legislator of the
universe.' ,

This "spirit of liberty," once adopted, fueled the

American Revolution.81 It led naturally to the moral claim
that the right of the people to alter their form of
government is absolute.82 As stated in the Declaration of
Independence:
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any
Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles and
organizing its Powers in such Form, as to
8 3 them shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

The Declaration of Independence, with its moral
justification for revolution, was the philosophical expression
of individual liberty and popular sovereignty that the
Framers sought to enshrine in a working constitutional
order.84 When it came time to crafting a constitutional
79. C. BRADLEY THOMPSON, JOHN ADAMS AND THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 50
(1998).
80. Id. (quoting JOHN ADAMS, A Dissertationof the Cannon and Feudal Law,
in 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 112 (Robert J. Taylor et al. eds., 1977)). Adams also
viewed liberty as a right of nature and believed that these rights would exist in
the absence of a God. See id. at 51-52.
81. See id. at 55. Adams described the American Revolution as "first and
foremost a revolution 'in the Minds of the People.' "Id. (quoting Leter from John
Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 24, 1815), in 2 THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON
LETTERS: THE COMPLETE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND
ABAGAIL AND JOHN ADAMS 454-56 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1971)). The colonists

were "'terrified' into rediscovering and restoring 'the noble foundations of their
ancestors.' " Id. (quoting Letter from Gov. Winthrop to Gov. Bradford (Jan. 26,
1767), in 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 80, at 192). It aroused in them
the '"spirit of liberty'. . . necessary to acquire and then keep one's political and
civil liberty." Id.
82. See Terrence M. Messonnier, A Neo-Federalist Interpretation of the
Tenth Amendment, 25 AKRON L. REV. 213, 215 (1991).
83. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

84. See THOMPSON, supra note 79, at 81 (stating that John Adams "sought to
identify, protect, and enshrine certain basic rights and liberties from the
intrusions of government").
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system, everyone agreed on two things. First, the ultimate
aim was to secure the unwritten, natural law rights of the
people.8" Second, this had to be accomplished through a
written constitution.86
The emphasis on a written constitution was the result
of reasoned consideration regarding the abuses the colonists
had suffered under the unwritten British constitution.
"[T]houghtful Americans had eventually concluded that the
British lacked a meaningful Constitution both because it
lacked the specificity of written law and because the
doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty permitted Parliament to ignore established principle."8 The remedy was a
written constitution that would limit the scope of the
national government's power and make clear that the
natural rights retained by the people fell outside the scope
of these powers.88 A sovereign people possessed of their
rights would be the ultimate bulwark for liberty, for then
the license of government would be limited on the one hand
by an understanding that certain natural rights could never
be infringed, and on the other hand with an understanding
that it could exercise no power but with the consent of the
people.
There was extreme disagreement on how to best ensure
that this written constitution would achieve its goal of
protecting the people's rights. The Antifederalists
demanded a Bill of Rights. "They repeatedly insisted that it
is 'universally acknowledged' that the natural rights 'can
to their
neither be retained to themselves, nor transmitted
89
posterity, unless they are expressly reserved.'
85. See McAffee, supra note 78, at 331 ("The modern debate is not over
whether it was a central end of the Constitution to secure natural rights.. ..");
see also THOMPSON, supra note 79, at 81 (noting that John Adams sought a
written constitution based on unwritten natural law).
86. See McAffee, supra note 78, at 332-34.
87. Id. at 334 (footnote omitted).
88. See id. at 334-35. "As one modem scholar has put it, whereas the British
relied on 'an unstipulated, imprecise constitution,' the Americans 'insisted in
contrast that the principles and rules essential for organizing power and
preserving liberty be separated from government and objectively fixed in
positive form.' " Id. at 334 (quoting Herman Belz, Constitutionalism and the
American Founding, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
333, 337 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis T. Mahoney eds., 1987)).
89. Id. at 339 (quoting Essays by the Impartial Examiner (Feb. 20, 1788), in

5

THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST

329 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)). The fear

in failing to do this was expressed by Patrick Henry when he said that "[ilf you
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The Federalists, while opposed to a Bill of Rights, also
sought to secure a constitutional status for natural rights.9 °
They relied on the Constitution's enumeration of limited
national power and an argument that a Bill of Rights would
be inherently dangerous in light of this federal structure.91
In fact, nothing brings us to the core truth of popular
sovereignty faster or more succinctly than Alexander
Hamilton's argument in FederalistNo. 84 against a Bill of
Rights.92
Bills of rights, he argues, are agreements between kings
and subjects. They constitute "abridgements of prerogative
in favor of privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered
to the prince."93 The U.S. Constitution is in no need of one
because it is "professedly founded upon the power of the
people."94 The people retain all rights, privileges, and
powers that they have not surrendered to government. "[Iun
strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain
every thing they have no need of particular reservations."95
Such particular reservations were not only unnecessary, but as Hamilton argued, dangerous as well. 96 A Bill of
intend to reserve your inalienable rights, you must have the most express
stipulation; for, if implication be allowed, you are ousted of those rights." Id.
(quoting 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 445 (Patrick Henry, June 14,
1788) [hereinafter ELLIOT, THE DEBATESI).
90. See id. at 345-46.
91. See id. at 347-48.
92. Hamilton was not the only person to criticize the call for a Bill of Rights.
James Irdell argued:
If we had formed a general legislature, with undefined powers, a bill of
rights would not only have been proper, but necessary; and it would
have then operated as an exception to the legislative authority in such
particulars. It has this effect in respect to some of the American
constitutions, where the powers of legislation are general. But where
they are powers of a particular nature, and expressly defined, as in the
case of the [proposed] Constitution before us, I think, for the reasons I
have given, a bill of rights is not only unnecessary, but would be absurd
and dangerous.
Id. at 347 (quoting 4 ELLIOT, THE DEBATES, supra note 89, at 149 (James Irdell,
July 28, 1788)).
93. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 1, at 512-13 (Alexander Hamilton).
This idea is precisely what natural rights and social contract theorists despised.
See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
94. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 1, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton).
95. Id.
96. Id. ("I go further and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and in the
extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the
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Rights "would contain various exceptions to powers which
are not granted" in the first place.97 Logically, this opens the
door for the government to claim more power than it was
given. For, if the people must declare, as an example, that
liberty of the press shall not be infringed, it must by
implication mean that some regulatory power exists in the
first instance upon which laws aimed at such rights may
rest.98 Creating such a text that reserves a certain right
creates the risk that government will seek to protect only
some specifically defined right. Instead of withholding all
affirmative power, bills of rights seek to negate an existing
plenary authority, which if not broadly accomplished leaves
room for the exertion of the government power falling
outside the scope of whatever right it is that was retained.
As Hamilton notes, men disposed to abuse power might
argue that:
[T]he constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of
providing against the abuse of an authority, which was not given,
and that the provision against restraining the liberty of the press
afforded a clear implication, that a power to prescribe proper
regulations concernin it, was intended to be vested in the
national government.

The creation of such constructive powers is precisely
what the Constitution, establishing a structure of government with certain limited and defined powers, was intended
to guard against.°° Thus, Hamilton viewed "[t]he
Constitution... itself, in every rational sense, and to every
useful purpose, [as] a Bill of Rights."''
Hamilton's and the Antifederalists' arguments both
echo the founding generation's opposition to unlimited
government. Hamilton and his federalist companions saw a
proposed Constitution but would even be dangerous.").
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 514.
100. Ironically, Hamilton was arguing that a Bill of Rights
might raise the inference that the Antifederalists were right, the new
Constitution created a government of general power like the extant
state constitutions-and many of the rights reserved by the limited
grants of power would be forfeited because they would not all be
specified in the bill of rights.
McAffee, supra note 78, at 348.
101. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 1, at 515 (Alexander Hamilton).
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written constitution as a tool to limit government by
dividing authority among different entities. The antifederalists sought to ensure the confinement of national
power by unambiguously placing the people's rights beyond
the reach of government, no matter how its powers were
defined. Both reflect the truth expressed in the Tenth
Amendment, "which serves as a reminder that there are
some powers delegated to the federal government and the
remaining powers are reserved to others."' °2 Those others,
ultimately, are the people. °3
C. The Second Amendment: PopularSovereignty Applied
In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall, in
discussing the Tenth Amendment, noted that it begged "the
question, whether the particular power which may become
the subject of the contest has been delegated to the one
government, or prohibited to the other."1 5 The Chief Justice
answered that it must "depend on a fair construction of the
whole instrument."'0 6
Unfortunately, most modern legal scholars have failed
to heed the Chief Justice's admonition. Many fall prey to
the conventional wisdom that the original Constitution and
the Bill of Rights represent "two very different types of
regulatory strategies."' 7 Even law school courses are
delineated in this fashion. Constitutional law teaches us
about the original Constitution and focuses on organizational structure, federalism, separation of powers,
bicameralism, republican government, and constitutional
1 The provisions of the Bill of Rights, thought
amendment. 08
to have little connection with these issues, are taught in
separate courses. Modern thought sees the Bill of Rights in
a vacuum. The scope of its provisions is defined outside the
context of the entire document; these stunted explanations
are asserted solely as a means to "vest individuals and
T

102. Messonnier, supra note 82, at 222.
103. Id. at 233 ("Powers are distributed to the state and national
governments, but the People remain the ultimate authority.").
104. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
105. Id. at 406; Bybee, supra note 50, at 575.
106. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406; Bybee, supra note 50, at 575.
107. AMAR, supra note 38, at xii.
108. See id.

20021

UNITED STATES V. EMERSON

467

minorities 10 9with substantive rights against popular
majorities."
This distinction is too easy. The original Bill of Rights
was intended to be more structural than substantive in its
protections; it was only one piece in the constitutional
framework of our compound government that, as we have
seen, was primarily concerned with protecting the people's
rights and popular sovereignty. While there is no question
that the Fourteenth Amendment significantly impacted the
provisions of the Bill of Rights and their interpretation, the
modern substantive view and the original structural
understanding are not mutually exclusive.1' Acceptance of
the Bill's structural role in the context of the entire charter
leads us to understanding the nature of the Second
Amendment's protections, even after the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
We have noted two basic facts from which our discussion may proceed. First, the Framers of the Constitution
envisioned a compound government. Within that compound
government it is clear that its operation is national to the
extent of its enumerated powers, but federal in that much
of the governing power is retained."' Second, the government's power rests on the consent of the people as the
ultimate sovereign. Thus, the government may only operate
nationally on powers granted to it by the people.
This conception of an incomplete national government
resting its power on the sovereignty of the people reflects
the Framers' conviction that "no 'merely federal' system
would suffice for the purposes of a union.""' For certain
governmental functions, a voluntary association of states
would not be adequate. They required the powers of a truly
national government. These prerogatives, outlined in
Article I, section 8, constitute the entirety of power
delegated by the people to the national government."' When
109. Id.
110. For a more complete discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment and its
impact on the Bill of Rights, see id. at 137-284; Louis Henkin, "Selective
Incorporation"in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963); Charles
Rice, The Bill of Rights and the Doctrine of Incorporation, in THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 11 (Eugene W.
Hickock, Jr. ed., 1991).
111. See discussion supra Part II.A.
112. Diamond, supra note 53, at 1280 (footnote omitted).
113. All legislative power is vested in the Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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the government acts according to these section 8 powers, it
does so on behalf of the citizenry as a whole. Remember, it
is national in character. However, as to those powers and
rights not granted to the national government, the people
could: (1) leave it to the people of the states to delegate it to
the state or local governments; (2) proscribe the use of
power by either the national or state governments; or (3)
not delegate the power to anyone.1 4
It can now be affirmatively stated that any retention of
power belongs to the people and not the states. While the
states are procedurally involved in the ratification and
amending process, and while they may, as political entities,
exert power given to them by the people, they themselves
had nothing to delegate; thus they have nothing to retain.
The people are the ultimate sovereign and when they
explicitly withhold power or refuse to delegate it, they
retain those rights that withholding such power protects.
Clearly, the states' rights theory of the Second
Amendment cannot stand. The provisions of the Bill of
Rights are explicit restrictions against government
authority; they constitute rights retained by the people, not
the states.11 The Second Amendment, regardless of how one
Congress is empowered to (1) lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises;
(2) borrow money; (3) regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the
several states, and with the Indian tribes; (4) establish uniform rules of
naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies; (5) coin money,
regulate the value of money, and fix the standard of weights and measures; (6)
provide for the punishment of counterfeiting; (7) establish post offices and post
roads; (8) secure patents and copyrights; (9) constitute tribunals inferior to the
Supreme Court; (10) define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas; (11) declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make
rules concerning captures on land and water; (12) raise and support armies; (13)
provide and maintain a Navy; (14) make rules for the government and
regulations of the land and naval forces; (15) provide for calling forth the
militia; (16) provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia; (17)
exercise exclusive legislation over the nations capital; and (18) make all laws
which are necessary and proper for carrying out these powers. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8.
114. Messonnier, supra note 82, at 241.
115. Having established that the Second Amendment constitutes a
reservation by the people and not the states, it is interesting to note a
jurisprudential split that appears to exist on the Supreme Court regarding the
issue of popular sovereignty. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S.
779 (1995), the majority's position rested on the notion that the Constitution's
authority is based on the consent of the undifferentiated people of the nation as
a whole. See Kevin J. Worthen, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Light of
Thornton: The People and EssentialAttributes of Sovereignty, 1998 BYU L. REV.
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seeks to define its text or interpret its history, provides a
federalist, structural protection for a right reserved by the
people as against the powers granted to the national
government. It's that simple; but let us look further.

III. AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT
A backup position seemingly exists for those who
concede the argument that the Second Amendment protects
the people and not the states, but who nonetheless oppose
the notion that the Amendment protects the individual's
right to keep and bear arms. It is that the popular
sovereignty line of reasoning itself "provide[s] support

for.., the collective nature of the right."116 As Professor

Akhil Reed Amar more poignantly puts it: "[T]o see the unReconstructed amendment as primarily concerned with an
individual right to hunt or to protect one's home is like
viewing the heart of the speech and assembly clauses as the
right of persons to meet to play bridge or to have sex."" In
137, 141 (1998). As Justice Kennedy stated in his concurring opinion, "the
majority believed that 'the whole people of the United States... asserted their
political identity ... when they created the federal system.' " Id. (quoting

Thornton, 514 U.S. at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). The dissenters disagreed,
holding that its ultimate authority stems from the consent of the people of each
individual state. Id. This paper is entirely consistent with the Thornton dissent
and views the majority opinion as having confused the operation of the national
government (which is national in character to the extent of its enumerated
powers) with the assent and ratification process by which the Constitution
derives its authority. See discussion supra Part II.A.; Thornton, 514 U.S. at 846
(Thomas, J. dissenting). Nonetheless, both theories support this Comment's
ultimate conclusion that the Second Amendment cannot be viewed as a
reservation of right or power by the states. All nine justices were in accord with
the notion "that the people, as the ultimate sovereign, have certain
fundamental rights of sovereignty with which [no government] can interfere
without express delegation from the people." Worthen, supra, at 141. The
Thornton debate is centered narrowly on the fundamental question of "Who
constitutes 'the people.' "Id. This debate leads to a separate argument, whereby
some claim, nonetheless, that the "people"-whether of the nation or of each
state-means the collective citizenry and not the individual. The argument is
disingenuous and will be addressed infra Part III.A-B. For now, it suffices to
say that the Amendment cannot be interpreted to be a protective reservation by
the state governments.
116. Worthen, supra note 115, at 162-63.
117. AMAR, supra note 38, at 49 (footnote omitted). While Professor Amar
agrees that the Second Amendment cannot be read as a states' right provision,
he views arms-bearing, prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, as
'collective, exercised in a well-regulated militia embodying a republican right of
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other words, while the right may belong to the people, it
does so in their collective capacity, not as individuals. This
opinion, that the people's right to keep and bear arms is,
nonetheless, collective, stems in part from an incomplete
understanding of the nature and purpose of militias as a
check upon the power of the national government.
A. StandingArmies and the MisunderstoodMilitary Check
of Federalism
One of the powers delegated to the national government
by the people was the right to raise and support armies.118
While monetary appropriations for such armies were not to
last for a period of longer than two years," 9 many worried
that permanent standing armies would form."'
The threat of a standing national army was, without
question, one of the most disapproved of and feared
provisions in the proposed Constitution. 1 Commentary and
debate on the process of ratification abounds with condemnation of standing armies as despotic and dangerous to
liberty.122 Accepted as "axiomatic,"23 at least one author
the people, collectively understood." Id. at 259. Amar does not deny, however,
that following Reconstruction and the Fourteenth Amendment, arms-bearing is
"individualistic" and "private." Id.
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (giving the Congress the power to "raise
and support Armies").
119. Id.
120. See THE FEDERALIST No. 24, supra note 1, at 157 (Alexander Hamilton).
The powers proposed to be granted in the national government were met with
the objection "that proper provision has not been made against the existence of
standing armies in time of peace." Id.
121. Alexander Hamilton wrote a total of eight papers in The Federaliston
the necessity of the national government's military power, a disproportionately
high number relative to the amount written on other subjects pertaining to the
proposed Constitution. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 22-29 (Alexander Hamilton).
122. In an address to the people of New York published in the New York
Journal,"Brutus" wrote:
The liberties of a people are in danger from a large standing army, not
only because the rulers may employ them for the purposes of
supporting themselves in any usurpations of power, which they may
see proper to exercise, but there is great hazard, than an army will
subvert the forms of the government, under whose authority, they are
raised, and establish one, according to the pleasure of their leaders.
X Brutus, An Address to the People of New York, N.Y. J. (Jan. 24, 1788),
reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND
ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER
RATIFICATION

86 (1993) [hereinafter

DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION].
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"presumed it... useless, to enter into a laboured argument,
to prove [it] to the people of America."" 4 This same author,
perhaps leaving nothing to chance, did just that. Quoting
the speech of Mr. Pultney, from the floor of the House of
Commons of Great Britain, on a motion for reducing the
army, he writes: 25
I have always been, and always shall be against a standing army
of any kind; to me it is a terrible thing, whether under that of a
parliamentary, or any other designation; a standing army is still a
standing army by whatever name it is called; they are a body of
men distinct from the body of the people; they are governed by
different laws, and blind obedience, and an entire submission to
the orders of their commanding officer, is their only principle; the
nations around us, sir, are already enslaved, and have been
enslaved by those very means; by means of their standing armies
they have every one lost their liberties; it is indeed impossible that
can be preserved where a
the liberties of the people in any 12
country
6
numerous standing army is kept.

This passage clearly expresses the classical republican
theory that a standing army of professional soldiers is
inconsistent with the concept of liberty. Whereas civilians
provide short-term service to local militias, "professional
soldiers owe their livelihood and income to the government."27 Professional soldiers are more aligned to the
interests of the government than the peolple, "whether its
leaders are dishonest and corrupt or not.""a The people are
more likely to act in the republic's best interest, regardless
of whether action is needed in support or in opposition to
the political leadership.2 9
Apprehension of standing armies was as much a result
of the colonists' own experience with the British as it was of
empathy for any theory or ideology. While Americans
initially did not question the limited presence of the British

123. IX Brutus, An Address to the People of New York, N.Y. J. (Jan. 17,
1788), reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 122, at 41.
124. Id.
125. VIII Brutus, An Address to the People of New York, NY. J. (Jan. 10,
1788), reprinted in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 122, at 734.
126. Id.
127. Dennis, supra note 2, at 76.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 76-77.
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army in the colonies, sentiment changed in the late 1760s."'3

British officials began to question whether the colonists
retained any constitutional protections and sent large
garrisons to New York and Boston to enforce new imperial
tax and customs collections. 3 ' Tensions mounted following
the Boston Massacre and the Boston Tea Party. Britain
proceeded to make various constitutional remedies illegal
and treasonous, and passed the despised Intolerable Acts.'
The outbreak of war soon followed after General Gage
ordered the surrender of militia arms, "previously kept in
private homes," and directed his army to confiscate arms
not turned over to the government. 3 This parade of
horribles that accompanied British troop occupation led
Thomas Jefferson to list among the King's "long Train of
Abuses and Usurpations" 34 the complaint that "[hue has
kept among us, in Times of Peace, Standing Armies,
without the consent of our Legislature."33
130. H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, The Second Amendment in
Context: The Case of the Vanishing Predicate,76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 463-64
(2000). In fact, Americans welcomed the army's protection against Spanish and
Indian raids, and slave insurrections. Id. at 463. Americans also benefitted
economically from trade with the army and navy. Id. at 464.
131. Id. at 463-64. The redeployment of British troops to Boston and New
York set off a wave of colonial resistance. See id. at 464-65. This included,
"refusal of local courts and juries to enforce Crown directives, reassertion of
local legislative supremacy, and revival of the local militia." Id. at 465. Others,
including the Boston committee of correspondence distributed "a torrent of
republican anti-army pamphlets.... [that] consciously harkened back to the
seventeenth century's radical, insurrectionary opposition." Id. Violent
resistance was largely limited to intimidating politicians and British officials,
tarring and feathering, rioting, and ransacking. Id.
132. Id. at 466.
133. Id. General Gage's orders brought "colonial hostility.., to a fever
pitch." Id. at 466-67. On April 19, 1775, Gage's army encountered provincial
militia at Lexington and Concord, called out to defend colonial powder stores.
Id. at 467. The Revolutionary War had begun. Id. For a more complete
discussion of the warrantless searches and seizures of colonial firearms by the
British, see Stephen P. Halbrook, Encroachments of the Crown on the Liberty of
the Subject: Pre-RevolutionaryOrigins of the Second Amendment, 15 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 91, 104-07 (1989).

134. THE

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

135. Id. During the Constitution's ratification process, Jefferson continued
to warn against standing armies and stressed the need for a bill of rights that
included protections against them. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in ADRIENNE KOCH & WILLIAM PEDEN, THE LIFE AND
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 404-05 (1944) [hereinafter SELECTED
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON]; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Alexander
Donald (Feb. 7, 1788), in SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at
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The Framers recognized, if they did not completely
understand, the skepticism over the Constitution's grant of
military power to Congress.136 Their initial response was to
include a " 'military check of federalism' ""' in Article I,
section 8, clause 16. It reserves to the states, "the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." 8 This check would arguably provide a fighting force
of citizens, officered, trained, and disciplined by men chosen
from the "from among themselves."'39 In the event of
government tyranny, the people, "fighting for their common
liberties and united and conducted by governments
possessing their affections and confidence,"' 0could organize
just as they did at Lexington and Concord and Bunker
Hill."" The people, with the advantage of being armed would
have their "national will"' directed into a "national force"'
409; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 416-17.
136. Madison writes:
The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall of the State
governments is the visionary supposition that the federal government
may previously accumulate a military force for the projects of
ambition.... That the people and the States should, for a sufficient
period of time, elect an uninterrupted succession of men ready to
betray.., and systematically pursue some fixed plan for the extension
of the military establishment; that the governments and the people of
the States should silently and patiently behold the gathering storm
and continue to supply the materials until it should be prepared to
burst on their own heads must appear to everyone more like the
incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged
exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions
of genuine patriotism. Extravagant as the supposition is, let it,
however, be made.
THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 1, at 298-99 (James Madison).
137. AMAR, supra note 38, at 50 (footnote omitted).
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
139. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 1, at 299 (James Madison).
140. Id.
141. See AMAR, supra note 38, at 50. Madison further explains:
Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess
over the people of almost every other nation, the existence of
subordinate governments, to which the people are attached and by
which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the
enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple
government of any form can admit of.
THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 1, at 299 (James Madison).
142. Id. at 300.
143. Id.
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by state and local governments of their immediate
choosing.4
This military check of federalism embodied in the

original Constitution failed to satisfy many Anti-federalists.

They continued to note the opening language of Article I,
section 8, clause 16 which grants Congress the power, "[t]o
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,
and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in
the Service of the United States."' 5 Many feared that this
would provide a pretext for the national government to
commandeer the militias; and if they could provide for
arming them, could they not disarm them as well?'41 6 Many
believed the provision would allow just that:
By this [provision], sir, you see that their control over our last and
best defence is unlimited. If they neglect or refuse to discipline or
arm our militia, they will be useless: the states can do neitherthis power being exclusively given to Congress. The power of
appointing officers over men not disciplined or armed is
ridiculous ....147

The precise purpose of the Second Amendment was to
ensure, in no uncertain terms, that Congress could not
disarm the militias.'
Nonetheless, those who view "the
people" collectively point to the structural interplay between the Article I military provisions and the Second
Amendment. They argue that the Amendment puts a "gloss
144. Id.
Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms
of Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear,
the governments are afraid to trust the people with arms. And it is not
certain that with this aid alone they would not be able to shake off
their yokes. But were the people to possess the additional advantages
of local governments chosen by themselves, who could collect the
national will and direct the national force, and of officers appointed out
of the militia by these governments and attached both to them and to
the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance that the
throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in
spite of the legions which surround it.
Id. at 299-300 (emphasis added).
145. U.S.

CONST.

art. I, § 8, cl. 16.

146. See AMAR, supra note 38, at 50.
147. Patrick Henry, Debate in the Virginia Convention (June 5, 1788), in
DAVID E. YOUNG, THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE BILL OF
GOVERNMENT, AND AN ARMED

RIGHTS

IN

COMMENTARIES

ON

LIBERTY,

POPULACE 1787-1792, at 374 (2d ed. 1995).

148. See AMAR, supra note 38, at 50.

FREE
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on Article 1,,149 such that, taken together, the Constitution
seeks to make a clear distinction between an army of
enlisted soldiers and a militia of citizens.5 Article I
"painstakingly prescribe[s] the precise role that state
governments have to play in training and organizing the
militia and in appointing its officers.""1 This militia system
seeks "to protect liberty through localism ...

bringing

together representative citizens to preserve popular values
of their society."15 The Second Amendment, then, provides a
guarantee that this collective force of liberty's bodyguard,
organized and led by state officers, would remain armed.
But, arms-bearing is "public, with the militia muster on the
town square," and "exercised in a well-regulated militia
embodying a republican right of the people."" Weapons are
to be maintained and provided by the state for the people
when needed to protect their liberties.
Even if the purpose behind the Amendment is partly
collective in nature, seeking to protect a community of
people and not the individual, it does not follow that in
practice its purpose must be effectuated collectively; it does
not follow that the Amendment only protects the public
storing of weapons for use by the entire populace when
needed. While that may be one valid method of arming the
militia, "the existence of an armed people from which to
draw the militia, a people guaranteed the right to hold
private arms, could have been seen as a key to fostering the
militia envisioned by the Militia Clause."15 Simply put, just

because the Amendment's protections may be framed, in
part, to enforce the right to bear arms in the community's
collective defense, it "need not imply that the [right] would
149. Id. at 56.
150. Id. at 54.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 55-56.
153. Id. at 259.
154. Thomas B. McAffee & Michael J. Quinlan, Bringing Forwardthe Right
to Keep and Bear Arms: Do Text, History, or Precedent Stand in the Way?, 75
N.C. L. REV. 781, 813 (1997) (emphasis added) (noting that even scholars such
as Laurence H. Tribe and Michael C. Dorf, who have been hostile to the
individual rights notion of the Second Amendment concede this point).
Recently, Professor Tribe has shifted views, stating that the Amendment
includes an individual right, " 'admittedly of uncertain scope,' to 'possess and
use firearms in defense of themselves and their homes.'" Tony Mauro, Scholar's
Shift in Thinking Angers Liberals, USA TODAY, Aug. 27, 1999, available at
http://www.saf.org/TribeUSA.html.
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have no application outside the actions of a formal
militia."155 As with any collective right, it must be applied to
and enforced in the benefit of the individuals who compose
the group.
Consider the right to choose national representatives,
which was at the heart of U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton.5 ' This sovereign right is one held by the people.
While the Justices in Thornton debated whether it was held
collectively by the people of the nation as a whole or
collectively by the people of each state, there was
unanimous agreement that it belonged to some group
constituting the people. "[Tihe argument that the right to
keep and bear arms has no individual aspect is similar to
contending that the right of the people to choose their
national representatives is a collective right that has no
application to individuals."'57 Just as the collective right of
the people to choose representatives may only be meaningfully effectuated when "each individual member of the
people has the right to vote," so too the collective right of
the people to "resist usurpation by force" through arms
bearing can only be meaningfully carried out if each
individual has the right to own weapons.'58
Illustrated differently, no one would argue that the
First Amendment's "right of the people peaceably to
assemble"'59 requires the bringing together of every citizen
of a state to be applicable. While it does carry "the collective
right of We the People to assemble in a future convention
and exercise our sovereign right to alter or abolish our
government," it also "protect[s] the ability of self-selected
clusters of individuals to meet together." 6 ° Likewise the
Fourth Amendment's protection of "the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects," 6'
certainly contains a protection for individuals and not the

155. McAffee & Quinlan, supra note 154, at 820.
156. 514 U.S. 779 (1995); see also supra note 115 (discussing Thornton).
157. Worthen, supra note 115, at 163.
158. Id.
159. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
160. AMAR, supra note 38, at 26. Amar argues that the First Amendment's
protections, while broad enough to encompass the rights of unpopular
minorities, was originally intended to protect the rights of popular majorities by
ensuring them a means to redress any self-serving behavior on the part of
Congress that did not to reflect the majority will. Id. at 20-22.
161. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
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collective citizenry only.162 "[We need not view the phrase
the people as sounding solely in collective, political
terms... [because] the language is broad enough to radiate
beyond its core" to protect the individual.'
B. Back to PopularSovereignty
Thus, that the individual is protected under the Second
Amendment is, at the least, a logical alternative to effectuating what is proposed as the Amendment's purpose of
providing for a collective defense. It is also consistent with
the manner in which we carry out all other collective rights.
However, having gone through a line of reasoning that
debates the collective rights advocates on their own turf, it
seems that those who argue "the people" must be viewed
collectively often succeed in steering us off the beaten path.
They concede that the Second Amendment protects the
people and not the states, then turn around and use Article
I to make the right a collective one that is defined and
constrained by a reservation to the states of the power to
appoint officers and train the men. They argue that the
relationship between the Second Amendment and the
debate over Congress's militia powers indicates an attempt
to ensure the proper allocation of militaryl6power between
the national government and the states.
However, "it
seems clear that the relationship between the Second
Amendment and the debate over Congress's militia powers
has been greatly exaggerated by commentators anxious to
limit the Amendment's scope. " Returning to the underpinnings of our popular sovereignty argument makes this
obvious.
First, it must be recognized that at the time the national Bill of Rights was being formed and adopted, virtually
all the state constitutions contained provisions in their bills
and declarations of rights that protected the militias and
the right to bear arms."
162. "On one reading, the amendment's language of 'the people' could be
read as reminding us that we must be especially watchful of government efforts
to use search-and-seizure powers to interfere with the people's political
activities." AMAR, supra note 38, at 65.
163. Id. at 67.
164. See McAffee & Quinlan, supra note 154, at 825.
165. Id.
166. Delaware's Declaration of Rights, adopted September 11, 1776, stated
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Second, it must be remembered that as the popular
sovereign, the people maintain the prerogative to retain,
delegate, or remove authority from government as they see
fit. 1" Protecting rights by retaining power may be accomplished either by refusing to delegate authority in the first
place, or by explicitly reserving them by banning the use of
power.16

In view of these facts, the question becomes: "What did
these [state constitutional] guarantees mean as against
state governments?"'69 The answer must be that they were
efforts by the people of each state to restrain the power of
the state governments. By logical necessity, the state-based
protections of the right to keep and bear arms must be for
the individual citizen. There is no political sub-unit of the
state that can be deemed to retain the right in the way it is

"[tihat a well regulated militia is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free
government." DEL. CONST. art. I, § 18, reprinted in YOUNG, supra note 147, at
752. Maryland declared in its Declaration of Rights, adopted November 11,
1776, "[that a well regulated militia is the proper and natural defence of a free
government." MD. CONST. art. XXV, reprinted in YOUNG, supra note 147, at 758.
The Declaration of Rights of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, adopted
October 25, 1780, declared "[tihat the people have a right to keep and bear arms
for the common defence." MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVII, reprinted in YOUNG,
supra note 147, at 773. New York, in its Constitution of April 20, 1777, provided
that "the militia of this State, at all times hereafter, as well in peace as in war,
shall be armed and disciplined, and in readiness for service." N.Y. CONST. art. I,
§ 50, reprinted in YOUNG, supra note 147, at 764. New Hampshire's Bill of
Rights, adopted June 2, 1784, stated that "[a] well regulated militia is the
proper, natural, and sure defence of a state" and that "[n]o person who is
conscientiously scrupulous about the lawfulness of bearing arms, shall be
compelled thereto." N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIII, reprinted in YOUNG, supra note
147, at 777-78. North Carolina's Declaration of Rights, adopted December 18,
1776, stated "[that the people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of the
State." N.C. CONST. art. I, §17, reprinted in YOUNG, supra note 147, at 762.
Pennsylvania, in its Declaration of Rights, adopted September 28, 1776,
declared "[that the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of
themselves and the state." PA. CONST. art. I, § 13, reprinted in YOUNG, supra
note 147, at 754. Vermont's Declaration of Rights, adopted July 8, 1777, held
"[tihat the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and
the State." VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. XV, reprinted in YOUNG, supra note 147, at
767. Virginia's Bill of Rights, adopted June 12, 1776, stated "[tihat a wellregulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the
proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state." VA. CONST. art. I, § 13,
reprintedin YOUNG, supra note 147, at 748.
167. See discussion supra Part II.B.
168. See discussion supra Part II.C.
169. McAffee & Quinlan, supra note 154, at 812.
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argued the states did via the Second Amendment. Any
other answer leads to preposterous results:
Particularly when conceived as a right against state government,
the right to "keep and bear" arms seems to be an empty shell if it
includes, for example, only the right to employ a firearm while
actually serving in the militia, but not a right to hold it privately.
Under such a construction, the state might constitutionally disarm
the people, and emasculate the protection to liberty that many
thought the militia provided, merely by prohibiting private
ownership
of weapons and then choosing not to call the militia to
17 0
duty.

In light of the declaration by the people of each state
regarding their individual right to keep arms, it seems
implausible that the people desired to reallocate power to
the national government in a manner that would allow it to
abrogate their existing individual right to bear arms. Why
would the people, through the Second Amendment, have
sought to create a structural limitation on the national
government to protect state power, with language drawn
from existing state constitutional provisions that served to
limit those very state governments?"' In other words, why

would the people demand protection for a state power that
was restricted or denied under the individual state
constitutions? There is no sound explanation.
The real explanation as to why the Second Amendment
protects the individual's right to bear arms takes us right
back to the discussion earlier that proved the people and
not the states were protected. It was not the debate over
Congress's military powers qua militia powers that led to
the adoption of the Second Amendment. The Second
Amendment was not intended to assure the proper
allocation of military authority between the state and the
170. Id. at 812-13. As a simply practical matter is seems inconsistent in the
context of militia service to think that citizens would not be able to keep their
arms at home. The militia was intended as a check on the power of the
government. Why would the citizenry entrust their weapons to the government
"for safekeeping between roll calls." Dennis, supra note 2, at 79. "Vesting
governments with the sole right to distribute and subsequently collect and store
arms when the militia is not in service would completely undermine the very
purpose such a militia is designed to serve in the first place." Id.
171. See McAffee & Quinlan, supra note 154, at 826. The language of the
Second Amendment was drawn directly from language included in several state
constitutions. Id.
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national governments. As noted, the argument falls apart
in light of the state constitutional protections for individual
arms bearing. Instead, there was a demand for the Second
Amendment because many feared the national government
would do an end-run around their enumerated authority,
create constructive powers, and abridge the individual right
to bear arms that was guaranteed by their state constitution.'72 That such constructive power would be deployed
via Congress's military power was only one, extremely
likely, possibility. However, "as with the other individual
rights guarantees included in the first eight amendments.., the Second Amendment stemmed from a general
fear that the national government was empowered... to
invade well-established rights of importance to the
people."'73 The national Bill of Rights was needed to provide
constitutional protection "for all of the fundamental and
essential rights of the people as contained in the state bills
of rights."7 The people wanted to ensure that their original
retention of right and power, reserved as individuals
against the states, was not unwittingly usurped by creating
a United States of America.
CONCLUSION

On October 16, 2001, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
rendered their decision on appeal in United States v.
Emerson.'75 The Court dedicated approximately forty-two
pages to discussing the text and history of the Second
Amendment.'76 It agreed with the district court's determin-

172. During debate at the Federal Convention on September 12, 1787,
George Mason made a proposal, seconded by Elbridge Gerry, that a bill of rights
be drafted to "give great quiet to the people." YOUNG, supra note 147, at 12. Mr.
Sherman responded that he "was for securing the rights of the people, where
requisite," and that "[t]he state declaration of rights are not repealed by this
Constitution, and, being in force, are sufficient." Id. This response is consistent

with the federalist position that no bill of rights was needed because no power
was given to the national government to abridge the rights of the people. That
Mr. Sherman was comfortable with this is simply the counter-argument to the
Antifederalists who feared the national constitution would allow Congress to
abridge the rights protected by the state constitutions.
173. Id. at 830.
174. YOUNG, supra note 147, at xlv (emphasis added).
175. The Fifth Circuit's decision is reported at 270 F.3d 203.
176. See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 218-60. As noted, the district court utilized
the same mode of analysis. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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ation that the Amendment protects an individual right to
keep and bear arms.177 Nonetheless, the Court reversed the
district court's decision because § 922(g)(8), as applied to
Dr. Emerson, did not violate his constitutional rights.178
Specifically, the Court held that the lack of express findings
regarding whether Dr. Emerson posed a credible threat to
the safety of his wife or child was not inappropriate.179
Section 922(g)(8) requires only that "the order 'explicity'
prohibit the use ...of physical force that would reasonably
be expected to cause bodily injury."8 ' The Court reasoned
that Congress expected the existing state laws to provide
the appropriate mechanism for determining whether an
injunction should be ordered and that the prohibitions of
the statute would not be triggered otherwise."8' Since Texas
law meets the general minimum standards for determining
when an injunction
should be issued, Dr. Emerson's rights
182
were not violated.
Dr. Emerson has appealed the Fifth Circuit's decision to
the United States Supreme Court.'83 While the issue
appears limited to whether § 922(g)(8) is unconstitutional
as applied to Dr. Emerson, that issue cannot be resolved
without first determining whether the Second Amendment
actually protects an individual right. Thus, if the Court
grants certiorari, it will likely be presented with the duty of
resolving the Circuit split on the meaning of the Amendment. The Court would have the opportunity "to either
enshrine or eliminate the Second Amendment right to keep
and bear arms."8 4
177. One line of questioning during oral arguments before the Fifth Circuit
panel (consisting of one Reagan, one Bush, and one Clinton appointee)
foreshadowed this result. See The "Good" and "Bad"of the Emerson Appeal Oral
Argument, at http://www.saf.org/pub/rkba/news/EmersonOralArguments.htm
(last visited Oct. 12, 2001). After the U.S. Attorney insisted that the Second
Amendment does not protect the right of the individual to keep and bear arms,
and that it only protects the bearing of arms that are used in service to the
National Guard, Judge DeMoss, Jr. stated to counsel, "You shouldn't let it
bother your sleep that Judge Garwood [the senior judge] and I, between us, own
enough guns to start a revolution in most South American countries." Id.
178. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 261-65.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 261.
181. Id. at 262.
182. Id.
183. See http://www.saf.org/EmersonViewOptions.html (last visited March
14, 2002).
184. See Fifth Circuit Facing Another Tough Decision: Emerson Impact
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If the Supreme Court should ever decide the case, the
Justices would show great wisdom in considering the statement that "what it means to take rights seriously is that
one will honor them even when there is significant social
cost in doing so."' Prudential arguments are inconsequential when it comes to fundamental liberty; just as some
criminals must go free and some groups must be forced to
listen to vitriolic hate speech, so too must society learn to
accommodate the untoward side-effects of protecting the
individual's right to bear arms.'86
The object of this Comment was to show that the right
to keep and bear arms is a fundamental liberty of the
individual, embodied in and protected by our constitutional
framework. It has sought to provide the reader with more
than a "few ripe quotations"" regarding the text or history
of the Second Amendment. It has appealed to the twin
pillars of federalism (as a component of our compound
government) and popular sovereignty that hold up the roof
of our constitutional republic. These pillars provide more
protection for the rights of the people of this great nation
than any individual component one may look at. The text is
important. So is the history. But in the end, it is the
preservation of the balance of power between the people
and their governments, of the right of the people to retain
that which they have not given up, which is best suited to
shield our freedoms and liberties.

Likely, at http://www.saf.org/pub/rkba/news/Spruill.htm (last visited Oct. 12,
2001).
185. Levinson, supra note 4, at 658.
186. See id.
187. BELLESILES, supra note 6, at 14.

